'Children are born primed to see religion all around them [...] belief in a god or gods does appear to encourage people to be nice to one another [...] An interesting corollary of this is a deeply held mistrust of atheists [...] "militant atheism" has failed to make headway.'
It goes on to further state that attacking theology will not affect people's natural belief in God. While it does also note that 'Religious claims still wither under rational scrutiny', this is not comforting reading in a scientific journal. So perhaps it is worth a look at each of the articles in turn.
Perhaps the most surprising article is 'Born believers' by Justin L. Barrett (admittedly an employee of a theological seminary, but let's not hold that against him).
He argues that almost from birth, children start to make sense of the world around them by recognising 'the difference between ordinary physical objects and "agents" - things that can act upon their surroundings.' He cites the work of Philippe Rochat at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia - babies too young to speak will watch a red disc chase a blue one around a computer screen for a while, then lose interest. If the roles of the discs are suddenly reversed, the babies' interest is rekindled, suggesting that they see one disc as a 'chaser' and the other as a 'chasee'. He adds to this evidence that we all (but especially young children) tend to see intent and purpose where there is none (the 'Hyperactive Agency Detection Device', though Barrett does not use quite that phrase). So 4 and 5 year olds agree with the statement that tigers are 'made for eating and walking and being seen at the zoo', and he further argues that this belief needs to be actively suppressed by education, rather than being something that children naturally grow out of. He backs this up with a study by George Newman of Yale University; babies (like adults) are unsurprised to see video of a ball knocking over some bricks, but look for longer (i.e. seem surprised) when the film is played in reverse and the ball appears to stack the bricks. When a face is painted on the ball (turning it into an 'agent'), they are not surprised by either event.
Barrett then draws a distinction between 'agents' and 'gods' - 'gods' possess superpowers such as 'superknowledge, superperception and immortality', and argues that children again tend to hold these views as innate rather than gaining them in later life. It is only by around 3 or 4 years old that children are able to develop a 'theory of mind' and understand the limitations (such as death, or incomplete knowledge) that others have.
He concludes with a note that this explains 'natural religion' rather than more complex belief systems such as Christianity.
He also includes an intersting side-bar entitled 'The Santa delusion', where he seeks to address the opinion that belief in god(s) is childish and something that should be outgrown. He uses three basic arguments here. The first is that people 'sometimes' come to believe in God as adults, but that the same is not true of Santa or fairies. I am personally unconvinced by this; this seems to me to have more to do with cultural norms than something innate. (Besides, I think that the move from unbelief to belief in god(s) is relatively uncommon - and the move from unbelief to belief in fairies, though rarer, does still happen; Conan Doyle being a prime example.)
His second line of reasoning is rather more complex: 'Santa and the Tooth Fairy also fail to fully fit the conceptual space that children (and adults) have because of their natural cognition. They do not readily account for perceived order and purpose in the nartural world.' Again, I am unconvinced by this; this seems to me a good way to account for the popularity of belief in god(s), but not really an important distinguisher between 'acceptable' (to Barrett) and 'unacceptable' beliefs for adults.
His final line of argument is perhaps the most persuasive. 'adults do not typically eat sacrifices placed out for gods and pretend that the gods ate them the way they eat Santa's cookies. If indoctrination and theatrical acts of deception were the bulk of what gods had going for them conceptually, adults would outgrow them too.' (My emphasis.) My only argument with that would be the inclusion of the words 'indoctrination and'; it seems to me that indoctrination into a factually incorrect (but genuinely believed) idea could indeed be self-perpetuating.
The next article is 'The idea that launched a thousand civilisations' by Ara Norenzayan. This notes that Gobekli Tepe - the oldest known religious structure in the world, in modern Turkey - predates modern agriculture, and uses this to link a pair of puzzles from human prehistory. Essentially, Norenzayam proposes that 'Some early cultural variants of religion presumably promoted prosocial behaviours such as cooperation, trust and self-sacrifice while encouraging displays of religious devotion, such as fasts, food taboos, extravagant rituals and other "hard to fake" behaviours which reliably transmitted believers' sincere faith and signalled their intention to cooperate.'
Religion is thus the origin of both larger societies and moral behaviour. Norenzayan does at least end on a more positive note - it appears possible for sufficiently developed societies to dispense with the religious beliefs that got them where they are and replace them with more secular approaches: 'These [Scandinavian] societies with atheist majorities - some of the most cooperative, peaceful and prosperous in the world - have climbed religion's ladder and then kicked it away.'
Robert N. McCauley writes on 'Natural religion, unnatural science'. This picks up where Barrett left off, with the idea that religion comes naturally to the human mind. It then points out that much of the justification for religious belief - 'theology' - uses the slower, analytical paths of thought. Although he offers little in the way to support this, he suggests that attacking 'theology' is a waste of time; it will simply shift and adjust in order to continue to protect the core, non-rational beliefs.
Finally, Victor J. Stenger and Alain de Botton are allowed to trot out their favourite tropes: respectively, that the existence of God is testable (intelligent design, intercessory medical prayer and so on) and disproven (which is a slight oversimplification, but broadly accurate); and that a secular system of ethics should incorporate a lot of the 'good' (helpful or beneficial) parts of religious moral teaching - rituals that build and bind communities. I find a lot to agree with, particularly in de Botton's article.
And as an addendum, in the 7th April issue, a letter from A.C. Grayling argues (very briefly) against the idea of 'God-shaped holes' that seems to be implicit in Barrett's reasoning.
No comments:
Post a Comment